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John J. Raymond here handles, with clarity and practi
cality. a problem which affects every one who files a tax
return.

That he is well qualified to deal with this subject is evident
from the list of his professional affiliations and activities.
He received his B.S. in B.A. degree from the University
of Southern California in 1934 and his L.L.B. degree from
W estern Reserve University in 1937.

He is a member of the State Bar of Ohio as well as that
of Michigan. In the Detroit Bar Association he serves on
the taxation committee. Formerly a senior tax accountant
with Price, Waterhouse & Company, he is now engaged in
the practice of law, and in addition teaches federal taxation
at Detroit Institute of Technology.
Whether or not you do tax accounting, we commend this
article to you.

TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION
By JOHN J RAYMOND, B.S. in B.A., L.L.B.

The subject of “tax avoidance and tax
evasion” is often regarded by laymen and
some accountants and lawyers as being
divisible into two distinct phases of Fed
eral income tax law, namely: (1) reduc
tion in tax through use of lawful means
(tax avoidance); (2) illegal attempts to
defeat collection of a taxpayer’s just
amount of tax (tax evasion). The first,
of course, is considered not only within the
law but also that which should not be sub
ject to question by the Treasury Depart
ment on the basis of bad faith.
This concept is subject to so many limi
tations, exceptions, and changes in statute
law and court decisions, that the distinc
tion is lost as being without a difference.
However, it appears that if tax savings
attempts are divided into three rather than
two categories a distinction becomes more
apparent.
Thus, let us place in the first classifica
tion all bona fide attempts to eliminate or
save tax; bona fide in the sense that they
are more than mere attempts to stay barely
within the letter and not the spirit of the
relative provisions of law. Within this
group would be included corporate liquida
tions, incorporations of new or existing
businesses, adjustment of the time of sale
of capital assets to obtain the maximum
benefit under the short-term and long-term
provisions of Section 117 of the Internal
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Revenue Code, setting up of irrevocable
trusts, making of gifts, use of the limited
powers of appointment, and many others
which, utilized in the exercise of good faith,
have been approved by the Treasury De
partment or at least upheld by the Courts.
In the second category which we shall
designate as the “twilight group” should
be included those attempts to slide along
the very edge of a statute or court decision
to the extent not intended by the law or
decision. The magnitude of “Clifford type”
or “Gregory type” cases together with the
seemingly unlimited husband-wife partner
ship cases indicates the need for a scrupu
lous and fair-minded attitude on the part
of tax counselors in advising on matters
which may cost a client several thousands
of dollars in later years. In order to pre
clude the happening of such an unfortu
nate event it behooves all of us to avoid
this “twilight group”. Perhaps some good
axioms to adopt in furthering such an
objective would be: “A client is best served
when kept free from litigation;” or, “if
you wish to take a chance in order to
establish a precedent, do it on your own
money, don’t risk that of your client.”
Obviously, in many instances there will be
exceptions, particularly where the client
expresses a desire to litigate, come what
may. Furthermore, the above observations
are made only with respect to the loop-hole

seeking accountant and lawyer. It should
not be construed as a condemnation of those
bona fide attempts which we have hereto
fore discussed.
Perhaps the words of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Helvering v. Gregory,
69 Fed. (2d) 809, 810, will give the key to
our problem of what is the difference be
tween avoidance and evasion:
“* * * Anyone may so arrange his af
fairs that his taxes shall be as low as
possible; he is not bound to choose
that pattern which will best pay the
Treasury; there is not even a patriotic
duty to increase one’s taxes (cases
cited).”
In contrast, however, the Court in speak
ing of a corporate reorganization went on
to say:
“* * * But the underlying presupposi
tion is plain that the readjustment
shall be undertaken for reasons ger
mane to the conduct of the venture in
hand, not as an ephemeral incident,
egregious to its prosecution * * *.”
Thus the Court lays the foundation be
tween “evasion” and “avoidance” by sub
stituting therefore the concepts of “sham”
and “reality”. Consequently where the tax
payer has acted under circumstances con
taining a legitimate business purpose, or,
in cases not relating to business, where the
actions are done in the normal course of
events rather than in the creation of a
favorable situation for tax purposes, tax
may be legitimately avoided or reduced.
Our last category, of course, relates to
those obviously willful attempts to defeat
by fraud the imposition of the proper
amount of tax. In order to punish those
who have been convicted and to discourage
the remainder, laws have been created
whereby both civil and criminal penalties
are provided for defrauding the Treasury.
Thus, under Section 145 (a) of the In
ternal Revenue Code any person who will
fully fails to file returns, submit informa
tion, etc., may be fined up to $10,000.00
and/or imprisoned for a year. Under Sec
tion 145 (b) any person who willfully at
tempts in any manner to evade or defeat
collection of taxes may incur an equal fine
and/or be imprisoned up to five years.
There are other or related statutes which
provide similar or identical punishment for
criminal violations. The time within which
suit may be brought in such cases varies
from three years in the case of a misde
meanor, to six years in case of a felony;
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the time being determined from the date
of commission of the offense.
An interesting development in the prob
lem of what constitutes the greater crime,
the failure to file a return and pay the
tax or an attempt to defraud the Treasury
of a portion of the tax due on a return
duly filed, was presented in Spies v. U. S.
317 U. S. 492. In that case the United
States Supreme Court took the position
that the mere willful omission to file a
return and pay a tax was a misdemeanor
whereas to commit a felony one would have
to be guilty of a willful act of commission
or attempt to evade tax such as “keeping
a double set of books, making false entries
or alterations, or false invoices or docu
ments, destruction of books or records, con
cealment of assets or covering up sources
of income, handling of one’s affairs to
avoid making the records usual in trans
actions of the kind, and any conduct, the
likely effect of which would be to mislead
or to conceal”. Whether the application of
this decision goes beyond the peculiar cir
cumstances of the case is somewhat ques
tionable.
With these statutory standards before
us, to what extent may the taxpayer ven
ture into the “twilight zone” without
eventually gravitating into the third cate
gory of fraudulent evasion of tax? It is
obvious to even the novice that no definite
borderline can be circumscribed so that
chances may be taken with impunity. This
is most emphatically brought out in Court
Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 531,
wherein the Government imposed a fraud
penalty under the following circumstances:
The taxpayer corporation entered into an
oral agreement to sell its property, and
having received payment of part of the
agreed price, then, at the last moment, and
admittedly for the sole purpose of avoiding
taxes, distributed the property to its stock
holders, who thereupon sold the property
to the purchaser for the same purchase
price. This case went to the United States
Supreme Court which affirmed the Tax
Court’s decision that the sale was made by
the corporation, not by the individuals,
but the Court also held that this attempt
at tax avoidance was not fraudulent. How
ever, it should be noted that it took a
decision of the highest court to determine
whether or not a fraudulent intent was
present, in an ordinary attempt to avoid
tax.
It is not too extreme for one to be of
the opinion that many instances of in

tended tax avoidance schemes might be
within the ken of willful tax evasion.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court
has held that the distribution of dividends
in the guise of compensation for services
may subject the taxpayer to criminal prose
cution. (See U. S. v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513).
Conceivably within this group might fall
such cases as those involving excessive and
unreasonable travelling and entertainment
expenses, and husband-wife partnerships
where the spouse as a partner is purely a
creation of legalistic manipulations. Any
borderline case should be considered in the
light of the Ragen case.
As stated previously, the law provides in
addition to the criminal penalties certain
ad valorem penalties based on the amount
of tax deficiency. Thus, for the failure to
file a timely return, unless it is shown that
such failure is due to reasonable cause and
not to willful neglect, there is a penalty of
5 to 25 percent of the tax, depending on
the duration of the default. (Section 291
of the Internal Revenue Code.) If any part
of the deficiency is due to negligence or
intentional disregard of rules and regula
tions, but without intent to defraud, 5 per
cent of the deficiency is added thereto; and
if any part of any deficiency is a result of
fraud with intent to evade tax, the penalty
is 50 percent of the deficiency. (Section
293 of the Internal Revenue Code.) These
are the major provisions relating to civil
penalties and it should be borne in mind
that they may be invoked regardless of any
prior prosecution or acquittal of a criminal
charge of willful attempt to evade tax.
Thus, in the case of Helvering v. Mit
chell, 303 U. S. 391, the Supreme Court
upheld the civil fraud penalty against Mr.
Mitchell who, in a previous case, had been
acquitted of the criminal charge of will
fully attempting to evade or defeat collec
tions of income tax. The prior judgment
is of no avail as a defense to the taxpayer
because the degree of proof required on
the part of the Government in the criminal
action must be beyond a reasonable doubt
whereas to sustain the 50 percent fraud
penalty the Government need only prove
the existence of fraud by a clear prepond
erance of the evidence. It may be of inter
est to note that in the Mitchell case, the
taxpayer also pleaded that the second case
placed him in double jeopardy for the same
offense. The Court dismissed this claim
by stating that the 50 percent penalty was
not a criminal punishment but a civil one
and therefore was a different type of
12

punishment.
Related to the subject of tax avoidance
and tax evasion is the question of when the
civil or advalorem penalty of 5 to 25 per
cent, provided by Section 291 and similar
sections of the Internal Revenue Code, at
taches for failure to file a return. As pro
vided by the statute if the failure is due
to reasonable cause, no penalty will be
asserted. However, the mere absence of
willful neglect, alone, is not sufficient for
avoiding the imposition of the penalty.
Thus in the case of Rogers Hornsby v.
Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 591, involving the
famous baseball player, the taxpayer signed
his prepared income tax return on Febru
ary 17, giving it to his wife with a check
in payment of the tax and advising her
to file the return and check on or before
March 15th. Mrs. Hornsby forgot to file
the return until May 17th. The Board of
Tax Appeals held that spousal forgetful
ness does not constitute reasonable cause.
Furthermore, employers cannot rely on
the neglect of their employees as a basis
for avoiding the penalty. (See Pioneer
Automobile Service Co. v. Commissioner,
36 B.T.A. 213). However, in the case of
Herbert Marshall v. Commissioner, 41
B.T.A. 1064, the taxpayer was relieved of
the penalty where he showed that his busi
ness manager had withheld money for the
purpose of paying the tax and when the
taxpayer discovered no return was pre
viously filed, he promptly filed and paid
the tax.
It should be noted that the advice of a
Revenue Agent with respect to the neces
sity for filing a return does not bind the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; a tax
payer who relies on such advice does so
at his own peril, without recourse against
anyone. This may seem at first glance to
be placing the taxpayer in an unfair posi
tion. But when consideration is given to
the complexities of the tax laws, one could
hardly expect the Bureau of Internal Rev
enue to give such wide discretion to its
employees.
The question often arises as to what
extent a taxpayer may rely upon the ad
vice of reputable legal counsel and that of
certified public accountants, with respect
to such questions. The tendency on the
part of the courts is to consider action
taken by a taxpayer, after seeking advice
from usually competent sources, as reason
able cause and grounds for avoiding the
negligence penalty.
The foregoing discussion of tax avoid-

anee, tax evasion, criminal penalties, and
civil penalties, is but a preliminary pre
sentation of the problems confronted by
taxpayer and accountant in this field of
income tax law. With the increase in the
staffs of revenue agents throughout the
country it is to be expected these problems
will, in the near future, become more
numerous.
Therefore, it should appear obvious that
the accountant who holds himself out as
being able to give expert tax advice must
not only possess the necessary qualifica
tions but he must also be careful as to
what type of advice he gives and as to
how that advice is applied. If he scrupu
lously avoids the “twilight zone” between
“avoidance” and “evasion”, pointing out
the possible consequences to a less scrupu
lous client, he will have done both his
client and his profession an invaluable
service.

TAX NEWS
(Continued from page 9)
for Federal income tax purposes (I.T.
3855).
A previous Bureau ruling as to the hold
ing period of a capital asset received in a
tax-free exchange for a noncapital asset
has been modified. The recent ruling
(G.C.M. 25301) is that the holding period
of property received in a tax-free exchange
includes the holding period of the property

surrendered. This ruling applies even
though the properties exchanged were not
capital assets at the time of the exchange.
An estate tax ruling (Special Ruling
6/18/47) to the effect that life insurance
proceeds were includible in a partner’s
gross estate where premiums were paid by
the surviving partner under a reciprocal
agreement should be of great interest to
persons who have planned to use life in
surance to finance business purchase agree
ments. The proceeds of insurance on the
decedent’s life which are payable to bene
ficiaries other than the estate are includ
ible in his gross estate for Federal estate
tax purposes if he paid the premiums
either directly or indirectly on the policy.
Since the survivor paid the premiums on
the decedent’s life in consideration for
payments by the decedent upon the sur
vivor’s policy, the decedent was held to
have paid the premiums upon his own life
indirectly.
The time for accrual of contested taxes
is fixed by G.C.M. 25298 as the year in
which they are fixed in amount and in
which the liability is established. Con
tested taxes include those which are con
tested with the tax authorities as well as
those contested in Court. If the taxes are
paid and a suit for recovery is later com
menced, the taxes should be accrued in the
year paid.
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